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A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS FOR THE
FORMULATION OF A PHILOSOPHY
OF CRIMINAL LAW
T- WO general views of the nature of crime have been advanced.
I One is the morally absolutistic, i.e., that crime is a violation of
the moral law.' The other is a social-utilitarian view, that crime is a
violation of the social order. 2 As to both these points of view,
a criticism may be made similar to that made to the idea that the law
protects prior-acquired property rights. Just as there cannot be
property without a legal order, so there cannot be crime without a
legal order. Crime is a legal conception; it is a legal label placed on
certain acts. An individual wholly apart from society cannot commit
a crime any more than he can own. Hence to call a crime a violation
of a moral law or of a social obligation or interest, is misleading
unless such moral law or social interest is recognized and protected
not only by the law of the community, but by the criminal law. Now,
since law is a product of, or perhaps coeval with, society, and crime
is a product of law, crime is indirectly a product of society, and in
that sense such statements as those of Saleilles,3 that "crime is a social
phenomenon.

.

.

. It is an outgrowth of social institutions," are

correct. But an action neither immoral or unsocial, nor in any other
way objectionable, may be a crime. For example, if the law provided
ten years' imprisonment for eating, eating would thereby become a
crime. Whatever the law says is a crime, and nothing else, is a crime.
A crime may then be defined as a criminal act, and a criminal act is
an act which is declared by the law to be criminal. A criminal is,
therefore, one who has committed a criminal act. It becomes irrelevant, now, to seek the nature of crime either in morals or in theories
as to the nature of social obligations. It does not, however, become
irrelevant to consider either morals or social utilitarian theories in
'Kant, Philosophy of Law.
-Saleilles, "Individualization of Punishment," page 4; "Crime is a social
phenomenon in the nature of a violation of a generally recognized social obligation."
3 Saleilles, op. cit.
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formiiig or discussing the criminal law, nor in the formulation of
criteria and ideals. It is in this search for criteia that a critical
philosophy of the law plays its important role, for it is only in the
light of such considerations that the law is enabled properly to deter4
mine what shall and what shall not be called a crime.
Before passing to the philosophic considerations involved in
attempting to find a basis for the criminal law, we are met with
certain empirical considerations. These will be accepted, not as
inherently necessary in the nature of things, but as hypothetical
premises on which to base what follows.
The first of these is that there is a society which, as a society,
desires to continue to exist, which contains members who individually desire to exist, and whose object is, in part at least, to bring
about such continued existence.
The second of these is, that there are certain " elements in both
the society as such, and in its individual members, which tend to
destroy it and them.
The third is, that both society and the individuals who compose
it. will, and do, take steps to protect themselves agairist the abovementioned elements.
On these assumptions, we may pass to a rough classification of
acts. There will be acts' which the individual will resent, as directed
against him or something which he values; there will be acts which
the state will resent as directed against it or something which it
values, and there will be acts which neither will resent. Obviously,
the first two classes may overlap. As to some of those acts, the
.tate will be content to let the individual take the steps necessary,
within limits. There then arise "rights" which can be "vindicated"
by "civil actions." As to others, the state will require its own vindication. The persons committing those acts are subject to criminal
prosectitions. Still other acts subject the actor to both civil action
and criminal prosecution. Lastly, some acts do not subject the actor
to either civil or criminal action, i.e., they are justified.
4 Holmes. Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 470, "What have we better
than a blind guess to show that the criminal law in its present form does
more good than harm?"
s It is interesting to note that "certain", used in this way, almost always
means "uncertain".
6 "Act" here is used broadly enough to include "non-act".

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

The philosophic problem is- to find a guide by which it may be
determined within which of the above classes a given act should 7
fall. Two persons come into contact with one another, and one,
claims the other, has "injured" that other. There will arise in that
"injured" person a number of feelings. He will, for example, have
some desire for revenge, "to get even." He will feel that he must
not let that same person do thd same thing again, either to him or,
perhaps, to others. He may go so far as to feel that other persons
should not do the same act. He may even condemn a whole class of
similar or related acts." The personal satisfaction of any of these
feelings or desires (particularly the first) is, or may well be, incompatible with the "instinct for self-preservation" which the group has,
but nevertheless the desire for some action does exist, and will tend
to find some expression; and so must be considered." The group,
being the stronger, may either allow personal action (which in most
cases it cannot now do), give some form of substituted revenge or
balm, i.e., action, or else make any personal revenge, in turn, the
basis of an action, i.e., justify the act. The individual will feel injured
for a number of reasons; among these will be harm to his body or
his property, an infringement of his personal or the general code
of morals, interference in his relations with things or persons, or
injury to other persons. If the feeling of injury is strong enough,
or the injury itself great enough, he will himself take steps to obtain
some sort of satisfaction, or else will feel dissatisfied with the existing
legal order. Since either or both of these (irrespective of any logical
justification) is opposed to social and individual self-preservation, one
of the considerations which must be taken into account in calling an
7The word "should" is here used advisedly, since by hypothesis the law

may put an act in any class. The existence, if any, of constitutional limitations on this power cannot, of course, be considered here. For example, it
may be that a breach of contract cannot constitutionally be made a crime.
See, e.g., Exparte Drayton, 153 Fed. 986 (1907) ; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S.
219 (1911). Yet it is in Macauley's draft of the Indian Penal Code. An in-'
teresting use of the word "should" is found in 4) Harv. L. Rev. 669 (March,
1928) in the comment on Keller v. State, 299 S. W. 803 (Tenn. 1927).
s It is not claimed that this is an exhaustive enumeration, or that these
various reactions are of the same strength, or even that one individual will
experience them all, either simultaneously or successively.
9Holmes, Common Law, page 61. "The law is made to govern men
through their motives, and it must, therefore, take their mental constitutiQn
into account."
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act criminal is the existence"° of these feelings and tneir strength,
and of the general moral code. That is to say, the law must either
provide an outlet for the expression of the feelings caused by an
alleged injury, or else put such penalties on that expression as may
be necessary to discourage or prevent it. On the strength of such
feelings, therefore, must rest the decision whether the outlet is to
be a civil or criminal action, or both, and if criminal, the nature and
severity of the punishment. 1 This, then, may be our first canon:
the natural reaction of a "reasonable man" to a given act will be
considered in determining whether or not that act is to be called
for
criminal. The stronger that reaction, and the greater the desire
12
crime.
a
act
that
call
to
be
will
it
individual action, the better
It will be observed that this will include only one of the above
classes of acts, i.e., those by which the individual feels personally
wronged, and some sort of legal redress is allowed. There remain
two other classes, one a subdivision of that class of acts which the
individual feels are injurious. There are those acts which the state
permits or justifies for reasons of its own, even though they are
injurious to the individual so far as his personal reactions are concerned, e.g., certaini kinds of competition, injuries committed without
fault, etc. The second is that class of acts which are, as between the
immediate persons involved, beneficial, but, as between state and
individual, injurious, e.g., rebates in interstate commerce, or nonpayment of taxes, and which the state therefore resents.
The former class may be dealt with in the same manner as the
first class, but rather from the point of view of protecting the actor
from possible action of the "injured" person. The object here is to
repress all expressions of a feeling of wrong. The law is departing
10

i.e., either probable or normal existence.
"As to this, see ittfra.
S12Holmes, Common Law, p. 41. "The first requirement of a sound body

of law is. that it should correspond to the actual feelings and demands of
the community, whether right or wrong." If p&rsons generally resent an act
and will defend themselves against it, that act should, in framing a criminal
code, be called a crime. It may well be that such an act should not be resented. The proper course is so to direct and mould the moral and ethical
code, that the commission of that act will no longer be resented. When that
has been done, the act may be permitted and no harm will ensue. If the state,
however, desires to permit that act at once. then the expression of any resentment thereto must be made a crime.
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from the community or individual standard and taking a broader
point of view, which it is seeking to impose upon the individuals.
The considerations of social policy and "social engineering" which
will dictate this attitude are beyond the scope of this paper. For our
purposes, however, we may find here, in the attempt to make the
individual bear his injury without attempt to right the wrong, if any,
our second canon: In determining that a certain act shall not be called
criminal, the chances of individual unsocial reaction thereto must be
1s
coiinteravailed by chances of social good, safety and expedience.
Once having determined that an act is justified, whether or not the
reaction thereto will be called a crime, will obviously be governed by
the same principles as any other act.
The latter class of acts which may be called crimes are those
which are beneficial or non-injurious to the parties, but which the
state, for reasons of its own, forbids. Here the considerations are
slightly different. It is not a case of revenge, for there is no wrong
done. It is merely the prevention of some possibly gainful action.
Since the temptation to engage in a prohibited action will increase in
proportion as the chances and desires for gain resulting therefrom
increase, whether civil action is sufficient or whether a criminal action
is necessary, will depend upon the intensity of the desire and the
amount of possible gain. This, then, may be a third canon, ie., to
consider these elements in determining whether the commission of
such an act is to be a crime or not.1"
It is fairly apparent that the answer to any particular question
would, on these tests, vary with each individual. It is submitted that
these variations do not permit of sufficiently precise measurement to
1s'See a similar notion of balancing expected good against expected evil,
from a more individualistic point of view, in Beccaria, Essay on Crimes and
Punishment, Chap. XXVII, page 94: "That a punishment may produce
the effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the
good expected from the crime, including in the calculation the certainty of
the punishment and the privation of the expected advantage."
14 Pushing this analysis one step further, these same elements should be
factors in arriving at a conclusion that the act should,,as a matter of social
policy, be prohibited or required. For example, it should have been a strong
factor in considering the passage of the prohibition amendment. With this,
however, we are not concerned here. The problem is more specific, i.e., given
that certain acts are undesirable and penalties should be attached to the commission thereof, should that penalty be (a) a civil action, (b) a criminal
prosecution, or (c) both.
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be considered, nor could any reasonably swift system of the administration of justice take them into account.'- The answer will vary,
however, not only with the individual, but with the place. In certain
localities some acts will be so generally looked upon with disfavor,
that the mere labeling of the act as a crime may be sufficient, whereas
in another place even heavier penalties might be insufficient.' 6
The above discussion necessitates taking into account this kind
of variation. Where the political divisions are small, and the population is homogeneous, the variation will be slight enough to be disregarded, but there is a substantial variation within areas the size of
some of the states of the United States. For purposes of the administration of the criminal law on this basis, there would be required
a division into homogeneous groups, based on general morality and
standards of conduct (similar, perhaps, to the federal districts). In
each of these, unjustified acts would be crimes or not, according
as they are viewed with favor or disfavor, within that group. Of
course, the ultimate question, whether or not the act is unjustifiable
at all, must be the same within all the subdivisions of one political
sovereignty. but the form of the remedy, it is submitted, may well
change from civil to criminal, and the criminal remedy vary from
.15 This is merely another illustration of the impersonality and lack of
individuality of all law
16For example, in rural communities, the more or less indiscriminate
•borowing" of farm implements without permission, or the practice of taking
a "short-cut" over a neighbor's land. is not frowned upon. Yet in an urban
community, such acts would be resented as trespasses and intrusions upon
privacy. Tarde, laying down in his Penal Philosophy (section 54, page 265)
the general proposition that "the classification of criminals should be psychological above everything else." says, "Let us classify murderers and thieves
separately according to the nature of their occupation and of their habitual
life before they are condemned, according to the social category to which
they belong." Then he draws a distinction between urban and rural populaions. Perhaps this paper contains something of that classification. Perhaps
Tarde's suggestion is more applicable to the grouping and treatment of prisoners in the prison. The necessity for a requirement of mens rea will likewise
vary with the location. The general feeling of repulsion to an act may in
one place he so great as to require some outlet irrespective of any mental
condition of the actor, e.g.. the running over of pedestrians by motorists in a
crowded city. In a rural community, this occurrence may be so rare that
there would be no feeling against the motorist unless he did have a certain
mental state.
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reprimand to death.' 7 Beccaria, writing in the latter part of the
eighteenth century, said, "Every member of society should know
when he is criminal and when innocenti" 's and he stresses the needof certainty.
It must be remembered that he was writing at a time when the
abuse of magisterial discretion, or, indeed, any other discretion, was
a commonplace, when punishments were brutal and harsh, when there
was a sharp distinction between the civil and the criminal law. It is
believed that conditions now have so changed that abuse of discretion
is or can be made so rare that the need for absolute certainty iE
thereby. lessened, that no such sharp line need be drawn between
criminal and civil law, that it is sufficient if a person knows he has
committed an offense for which he is responsible to some one, be it
civilly or criminally. The commission of any wrong, breach of contract or murder, for which the law gives a remedy, is injurious to
society. The injuries differ only in degree. Whatever penalty is
adequate, for the purposes of the individual and society, comprised
The classic distinction between compensation and punishment is one
sometimes difficult to trace. Both can well be merged in a system whose
object is both. This would grfatly simplify procedure, if it has no other
merits. Moreover, as has been often pointed out, some civil wrongs are more
injurious than some crimes, and some civil penalties are morq severe than
some punishments. The variation from reprimand to death is extreme. It is
hardly possible that the same offence can be adequately dealt with by reprimand, if, in some not distant place, the requisite penalty is death. Yet in
Louisiana, for example, the punishment for arson in the first degree is hanging, or from one to ten years' imprisonment. For variations in the amount
of punishment for the same crime, see the summary compilation in the World
Almanac for 1927, page 211 ff. See also the N. Y. Baumes Laws. Severer
punishment for second offenders has been held to be constitutional: Moore v.
Missouri, 159 U. S. 673; Graham v'. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616.
18 Crimes and Punishment, Chap. XI, page 45. See also Chap. V, page 26:
"Crimes will be less frequent in proportion as the code of laws is more
universally read and understood; for there is no doubt but that the eloquence
of the passions is greatly assisted by the ignorance and uncertainty of punishment." It is submitted that the certainty required is rather of liability than
of the precise amount of punishment. Moreover, there will be certainty
within each division at any given time. There will, of course, have to be
reached some solution of the problems raised by acts in one division having
effects in other divisions. The principles of causation might here be made
inadequate alone. See 33 Harv. L. Rev., 843.
17
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in a general law of obligations, civil and criminal, restitutional and
punitive, should be imposed. 19
The variations in a general moral or other standard due to the
This may well be done by some
time element must be considered..2
administrative body with broad and flexible powers, which would
actually perform Ehrlich's method of study, and become, like Carter's
judges, experts in custom.
Acts could be shifted from civil to criminal, or vice versa, and
the amount of punishment varied, as they or their investigations suggested.2 1 Here again, the same answer may be made to the argument
of uncertainty as was made before.
Without going into the question whether there is a criminal type,
it may be admitted that certain people do do acts because of biologic
or psychic causes, e.g., kleptomaniacs. Such persons, if they exist,
require special treatment, for. the purposes of cure, or protection to
others, rather than punishment 22 or restitution or outlet for feelings
of vengeance.
The foregoing may suggest, beyond a theory of the classification
of wrongs, a theory of punishment. "In dealing with a disturber,
society has two objects: to avoid further harm from this man, and
to guard itself against would-be offenders." 23 "The legitimate purpose of punishment is to make of the criminal an honest man, if that
be possible, or if not, to deprive him of the chance of doing further
harm." 24
19 On this principle a subordinate authority such as a municipality should
consider whether or not a state statute imposing a penalty on an act is not
sufficient without municipal action, thus avoiding duplication. See, e.g., City
of N. Y. v. Marco, 58 Misc. 225 (1908).
20 Indubitably, the street attire of a modern young lady of fashion would
have had a different effect upon Peter Stuyvesant than that which it has on
James Walker.
21 This might be an answer to what Dr. Pound has listed as one cause of
popular dissatisfaction with the law, i.e., the lag between changes in popular
conceptions and their expression in the law. Pound, Proceedings of the
American Political Science Association for 1907, Vol. 4.
22Holnes, Path of the Law. 10 Harv. L. Rev. at p. 470: "If the typical

criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or murder . . . it is idle to talk

of deterring him. - . . He must be got rid of."

23 Ross, Social Control, p. 107.
24 Saleilles, Individualization of Punishment.
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Greater specificness is required. A more complete (though no
doubt not exhaustive) enumeration of the objects of a criminal law,
based on the views advanced herein, would include the following:
1. Compensation, if possible to those injured, by fine if that
punishment is deemed sufficient, 25 or by productive labor; 26
2. Close association between the punishment and the act, so that
thought of the act at once brings up the picture of the penalty;
3. Prevention of this same act by this same man;
4. Prevention of other crimes by this man;
5. Prevention of this same act by other persons;
6. Prevention of other crimes by other persons;
7. Expression of individual and social disapproval;
27
8. Stimulation of imitation of legal conduct.
The amount and nature of punishment will likewise be governed
by the general feeling concerning the act which is being punished.
The stronger the general feeling, the less necessity for punishment.
Fine, reprimand or even the mere fact that the act is called a crime,
may be sufficient.-" Where there is no particular moral feeling either
way, or where there is no -injury, the amount of gain whIch its prohibition does away with, or the annoyance which its commanding may
entail, must likewise be considered in fixing the punishment. Similar
machinery will take care of variations in the nature and amount of
punishment, due to time and place. There may be even greater
flexibility here than in determining whether an act is to be a crime
or not.
25 See, as an attempt to prevent the punishment from falling on the
offender's family, the system of paying fines in instalments, said to be a reason
for the lack of overcrowding in English prisons. L. N. Robinson, European
Methods and Ideas of Penal Treatment.
28 In this connection may be considered projects for converting prisons
into factories and paying the convicts regular salaries which are to be turned
over to their dependents.
27 See generally, Tarde, "Les lois de L'imitation," for what Pound calls
a "demonstration of the extent to which imitation is a factor in the development of legal institutions and his working out of the psychological or sociological laws of imitation." 25 Harv. L. Rev. 504, "Sociological Jurisprudence."
28 It is undoubtedly true that many people will refrain from doing acts
merely because they are illegal. For example, even a taxicab driver will stop
at traffic signal lights when no policeman is about. On the other band, some
people delight in doing things merely because they are illegal or prohibited.
For example, it has become "smart" to purchase alcoholic beverages, or
censored books or periodicals.
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In accomplishing these results, what means can the law use?
Fear of the punishment is basic, but even it has its limitations, for
9
there are alvays venturesome or fearless, or careless people.Y
Another is to create in the popular consciousness a feeling of
disapproval for one who commits a crime. It has been said that the
true purpose of punishment is active disapproval of the criminal.3
This, too, is limited, for first, it is not always possible to create this
disapproval, and secondly, it is dangerous, for the disapproval may
be so great as to ostracize an ex-convict, prevent him from thereafter
"earning an honest living" and so "drive him to crime" again.
Imitation of virtuous conduct, or perhaps some form of reward
for virtuous conduct, is of value.
Undoubtedly, an educated and intelligent public opinion will do
much to prevent crime. It is this thesis which is so remarkable in as
early a work as Beccaria's. , ' The methods of doing this are beyond
the scope of this paper. Education in the school, the home and the
church, to breed a Socratic respect for the law is fundamentally
the only escape from so-called crime waves.
The individualization of punishment would lead too far afield,
and no attempt will be made to treat of it, other than to agree with
Dean Pound's statement in the introduction to Saleilles' book, that
what is needed is a system of individualization, a sort of criminal
equity. Perhaps the suggestions herein are similar to Saleilles' first
type of individualization, i.e., legal. It may be a sort of "objective
individualization" adopting the punishment rather to a group than to
an individual. Perhaps a refinement would lead us to say that feel2DPound, Proceedings of American Political Science Association for 1907,
Vol. 4, page 229. And. of course, if crime is a result of biological conditions
in the individual, it is entirely possible that fear will have no effect whatsoever.
30Von Bar, Moral Reprobation Theory of Penal Law, in the Rational Basis
of Legal Institutions, page 588 ff.
31Crimes and Punishment. Ch. XLII. page 151: "Would you prevent
crime? Let liberty be attended with knowledge," and Chap. XLIV, page 156,
"Finally the most certain method of preventing crime, is to perfect the system

of education."
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ings of disapproval, condemnation, revenge, whatever they are-are
stronger against, e.g., professional, than casual offenders, so that the
punishment of the latter should differ. Or the objection may be
2
made that the whole system is impractical.
EUGENE BLANc, JR.

New York City.
32 Perhaps it is. But the objection that the logical outcome of this basis
of punishment would be to punish more severely a breach of a parking ordinance than an offense such as robbery because there is more public feeling
about the latter, is not sound, for the consideration of other factors (which
is not hereby excluded), such as protection, may well change the result arrived
at by considering one factor alone.

